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Book Review: Questioning Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty,
And The Rule Of Law In Modern Egypt
The central questions of the Arab uprisings—what is the appropriate relationship between
religion and politics and what is the function of the national security state —have developed
into a vigorous debate amongst actors from across the political spectrum. But what, exactly, is
secularism? What is its relationship to the ‘deep state’ in Egypt? In Questioning Secularism,
Hussein Ali Agrama  focuses on the Fatwa councils and family law courts of Egypt just prior to
the revolution, to argue that secularism is a historically contingent phenomenon that works
through a series of paradoxes that it creates. He probes the meaning of secularism and the
ambiguities that lie at its heart. Reviewed by Corinna Mullin.
Questioning Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty, And The Rule Of Law
In Modern Egypt. Hussein Ali Agrama. University of Chicago Press.
November 2012.
Find this book: 
Hussein Ali Agrama  was f inishing the manuscript f or his book in late 2011
as the dramatic events that would eventually result in the ousting of
Hosni Mubarak unf olded in Egypt. Questioning Secularism nevertheless
provides a compelling lens through which to make sense of  recent
developments in Egypt, including ongoing f orms of  revolutionary
mobilisation, the actions of  a f irmly entrenched ‘deep-state’, and
attempts by various polit ical elites to usurp revolutionary legit imacy.
Combining insights f rom the anthropology of  religion and law, the book
makes two key claims: that liberal secularism is one of  the principal
means through which modern state power operates, and that spaces of
‘asecularity’ are the most evident means by which this power is resisted.
Agrama starts f rom the premise that, with respect to the modern state,
the domains of  the religious and the secular must be understood as ‘mutually constitutive of
each other ’ though of ten in ‘tense and contradictory ways’ (p. 1). Agrama begins by grappling
with a paradox posed by Talal Asad’s contention that ‘the concepts, assumptions,
sensibilit ies, and practices of  secularism as a doctrine’ of ten work in a way ‘to undermine
secularism as a modern polit ical arrangement’ (p. 2). Agrama takes the secularism puzzle one step f urther,
by seeking to understand not only why this undermining occurs, but also the modes and modalit ies through
which it occurs. In order to do so, he makes the case f or examining secularism as a ‘problem-space,
constituted by a historical ensemble of  questions and stakes and characterized by continual contestation’
(105).
In order to explore these tensions and paradoxes of  secularism as it moves f rom doctrine to practice,
Agrama examines the case of  Egypt. This may seem a counterintuit ive case by which to explore modern
secularity, given the primary place of  religion in the Egyptian state even bef ore the Muslim Brotherhood’s
ascent to power. But through a discussion of  how state interventions in a ‘liberal direction’ (p. 3) have
transf ormed even those areas of  the Egyptian legal and institutional f ramework that clearly seem guided by
religion and religious law, the author argues that Egypt is the ideal case to explore the ‘deeper anxieties’
concerning ‘contemporary secularity and our abilit ies to def ine and secure it ’ (p. 3).
Islam as Discursive Tradit ion
In order to understand the dynamics of  these legal transf ormations, and the af f ective-conceptual
structures through which they f unction, Agrama undertakes a detailed ethnography of  both the personal
status courts and the Fatwa Council of  Al-Azhar, both of  which derive their decisions f rom Shari’a and deal
with overlapping issues, in particular in relation to the private af f airs of  f amily. Although, as Agrama argues,
the courts have come to operate according to very dif f erent ‘conceptual and af f ective relationships’ they
nonetheless share similar roots in the set of  19th century Brit ish colonial-era legal and institutional
ref orms, when ‘the active principle of  secularism, a public/private distinction, and a rule of  law f ramework’
came to be established (p100).
As Agrama points out, it was only relatively recently that the f atwa and the court were separated into
‘exclusive spaces of  their own’, entailing a gradual process of  liberal legal ref orm that ‘aimed at bringing the
Shari’a under the rule of  law’ (p. 111). From then on, the courts would consist of  a space in which all those
f eatures of  the ‘rule of  law’ would be invested, whereas the Fatwa Council would address those aspects
‘deemed irrelevant to the rule of  law’. As such, a comparison between the courts and the council enables
Agrama to highlight and map the complex interactions between two seeming disparate legal tradit ions and
the resulting transf ormations that occur in the way in which Sharia’ is understood and practiced. In doing
so, he also f acilitates a more general understanding of  the ways in which authority f unctions in the modern
state (p.111).
The ‘Law’s Suspicion’ and Fatwa’s Authority
One of  the key conclusions derived f rom this comparison is the distinction between the type of  authority
on display through the Fatwa Councils, in which rulings are of ten f ollowed despite their non-binding
character, as opposed to those of  the personal status courts, which, though intended to be binding, are
generally only f ollow when combined with some f orm of  enf orcement measure (p. 119). Many of  the
examples provided pertain to issues of  marriage and divorce.
At the risk of  over-simplif ication, Agrama argues that the reason the personal status courts are
approached with greater suspicion, and are theref ore denied the authority of  the Fatwa Council, has to do
with the modes and mechanisms by which liberal power operates. Most importantly, liberalism’s construction
of  the law as ‘subsequent to an a priori f ree self  and theref ore a suspect mode of  domination external to
it.’ In this sense, ‘vigilance and suspicion’ mutually enable the f unction and legit imacy of  a liberal legal (and
polit ical) system. These are not ‘natural, def ault conditions, but are instead historically cult ivated
sensibilit ies whose cult ivation depends integrally on modern legal processes’ (p. 127).
In this sense, one could conclude that the most ef f ective means of  resisting modern state power is not
through vigilance and suspicion, but rather through the construction of  an altogether separate space of
authority. Putting aside important normative concerns over the alternative f orms of  exclusion and hierarchy
such conf igurations might produce, Agrama comes to understand Fatwas as an area existing outside of  the
liberal state’s sovereign power (p. 180). In occupying a space of  ‘asecularity’, Fatwas theref ore resist the
‘mode of  power’ that is derived f rom ‘vigilance against power’ (p. 179).
The National Security State and Sovereign State Power
In chapter six and then again in the epilogue, the book examines the relationship between the national
security state and f orms of  sovereign state power. Here Agrama argues that the national security state
inf rastructure is a natural outcome of  the expansion of  liberal, secular power into the Egyptian state. This
process results in the ‘normalization of  constant threat’ and the transf ormation of  the ‘emergency
response into a disposit ion of  the state and of  everyday lif e’ (p. 232). This analysis has wide-ranging
implications f or how we understand Egypt’s decades-old national security state as well as the implications
and logic of  national security elsewhere in the world, in particular in light of  the ‘war on terror ’. For Agrama,
the f urther entanglement of  national security with secularist doctrine has, paradoxically, enabled ‘the
growth of  religiously rooted and resonant languages of  justice’ (223).
Though the book contains a compelling ethnography of  the discourses and practices of  Islamist lawyers
vis-a-vis the ‘Egyptian emergency state’, this component of  the analysis perhaps could have been f urther
enhanced by relating it back to a genealogy of  the national security state, with its relationship to the other
f orms of  modern state power discussed in this book more explicit ly stated.  In addition, it would have been
interesting to consider the place of  (neo)liberal economic power in this equation. In particular considering
how central demands f or social and economic justice were to the 2011 revolution, as well to the continuing
f orms of  revolutionary mobilisation.
The Ongoing Revolution: Resisting or Reproducing Multiple forms of Sovereign State Power?
For Agrama, the revolutionary movement that emerged in late 2011 provided much cause f or optimism, in
particular in its seeming ability to transcend the logic of  suspicion linked to secular state power. By bringing
together diverse sectors of  society animated by a set of  agreed upon principles, in particular ‘that no one-
no one person, group of  people, social or economic class, religious or secular polit ical orientation- should
have a monopoly of  power,’ this movement, like the Fatwa Council, seemed to operate in a space of
‘asecularity’. In this sense, it adopted a posture of  ‘indif f erence to the question of  where to draw a line
between religion and polit ics’ (p. 232) Implicit in the protesters’ demands was not only their rejection of  ‘the
state of  emergency that long obtained in Egypt but also against the underlying paradigm that had
increasingly normalized it,’ and which had alienated Egyptian cit izens not only f rom the state but also f rom
one another (p. 232).
Agrama’s concluding sentence provocatively t ies together the key themes of  the book. ‘What matters,’ he
argues ‘is not whether Islamists or liberals succeed in parliament, but whether state sovereignty succeeds
in f urther asserting itself  into social lif e, the state retains or increases its monopoly on polit ics, and the
conceptual-af f ective structures through which secular power works will f urther dispose us to the paradigm
of  national security, which has dominated the globe’ (p. 235).
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